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Abstract: This paper develops a taxonomy of the „dark side‟ of financial 
innovation and applies it to two recent high-profile financial innovations; 
exchange traded funds (ETFs) and high frequency trading (HFT). The first half 
of the paper develops the taxonomy through a review of related literature. 
Accordingly, the negative effects of financial innovation are categorised as (1) 
predatory schemes (2) abuse of financial innovation and (3) unintended 
consequences of financial innovation. The second half of the paper applies the 
taxonomy to ETFs and HFT, thus allowing for a better understanding of the 
risks posed by ETFs and HFT. We explore these risks with examples and in the 
context of current efforts to reform financial regulation following the 2007-
2008 „credit crunch‟. In the latter case we draw on a G20 survey that explored 
the capabilities of regulators to mitigate the negative effects of financial 
innovation. Overall, we conclude that even though both innovations offer 
potential societal benefits of greater market efficiency (HFT) and more 
effective diversification (ETF), both pose considerable and contrasting risks. 
These risks can be mitigated by strengthening regulatory capabilities with 
respect to financial innovation and by firm level corporate governance 
improvements.   
Keywords: Financial Innovation, Financial Regulation, Financial Risk, High 
Frequency Trading, Exchange Traded Funds, Systemic risk, EU Policy, Flash 
Crash. 
 
1 Introduction   
The 2007-2008 credit crunch and the subsequent financial, economic and sovereign debt 
crises have put financial innovation high on policymakers and regulators agendas (Allen 
& Yago, 2010). This is not surprising since, as observed by Brunnermeier (2009, p.78), 
the financial innovations “that had supposedly made the banking system more stable by 
transferring risk to those most able to bear it led to an unprecedented credit expansion 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974914
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that helped feed the boom in housing prices”. These complex innovations included 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and credit 
default swaps (CDS). They have contributed to, or at a minimum exacerbated, the most 
severe financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression (Allen, 2011, Mason, 
2008).   
 
In response to the crisis there have been wholesale reviews of financial regulation and a 
reform process that is ongoing and subject to continuing debate. New institutions have 
been created. For instance, at the international level the G20 government grouping 
established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) following its London summit in April 
2009. The FSB has the task of „address(ing) vulnerabilities and to develop and 
implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial 
stability‟.1 In Europe a new regulatory architecture termed the „European System of 
Financial Supervisors‟ (ESFS) has been established. 
 
Despite the enactment of new legislations and the establishment of new regulators, plenty 
of issues still remain to be resolved in the emerging regulatory paradigm. Amongst these 
is: how can financial innovation be made safe? Accordingly, the Financial Stability 
Forum, the predecessor to the FSB, recommended that; 
 
“Supervisors should see that they have the requisite resources and expertise to  
oversee the risks associated with financial innovation and to ensure that firms they 
supervise have the capacity to understand and manage the risks.”(FSF 2008, p.40) 
 
 
In the context of this recommendation this paper explores two questions;  
 
1. How can the extant literature on the negative impacts of financial innovation help 
classify, through a taxonomy, the divergent origins, nature and characteristics of the 
„dark side‟ of financial innovation? 
2. How can this taxonomy help us understand the types of risk posed by two „recent‟ 
financial innovations (exchange traded funds and high frequency trading)?  
 
With respect to the first research question it is evident that financial innovation has long 
been a contentious issue (see for example Van Horne, 1985). It is a double edged sword; 
it can be a force for good but it can also have negative consequences since financial 
innovations are often associated with financial crises and financial malpractice. Despite 
commentaries and broad acknowledgment that financial innovation is a double edged 
sword, the preponderance of formal analyses of financial innovation have, until recently, 
focused principally on the positive impact of financial innovation (for a review of this 
literature see Frame and White, 2004). The last few years have, however, seen the 
emergence of studies on the „dark side‟ of financial innovation (for instance Henderson 
and Pearson, 2011). Accordingly, theoretical and empirical contributions have covered 
the negative consequences of a range of financial innovations, including structured equity 
products and credit derivatives. These studies have shed light on the origins, nature and 
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differing characteristics of the negative consequences of financial innovations. To the 
best of our knowledge there have been no prior attempts to summarise this literature and 
to classify the divergent origins, nature and characteristics of the „dark side‟of financial 
innovation. Accordingly, the first half of this paper does this by developing a taxonomy of 
the „dark side‟ of financial innovation. 
 
With respect to the second research question, the paper applies taxonomy of the „dark 
side‟ of financial innovation to two recent high-profile financial innovations; exchange 
traded funds (ETFs) and high frequency trading (HFT). Both HFT and ETFs epitomise 
modern „high speed‟ finance. They have been enabled by financial deregulation and by 
rapid technological change in finance that belies high profile predictions in the 1980s that 
the pace of technological change and innovation in finance would diminish (Miller, 
1986). Both innovations have virtue. HFTs tend to enhance market efficiency by 
increasing market liquidity. ETFs are cost effective and liquid hedging instruments or 
investment vehicles. In their role as investment vehicles they allow investors, especially 
retail investors, the possibility of accessing a much wider range of asset classes than had 
hitherto been possible, thereby allowing them to benefit from diversification into asset 
classes that were only available to large institutional investors before. Yet both 
innovations have, however, been associated with problems in financial markets and have 
attracted the attention of regulators. 
 
Thus we focus on HFT and ETFs because they are relatively recent innovations and 
consequently little has been written about them in the academic literature from an 
innovation-risk perspective (as compared to the innovations associated with the „credit 
crunch‟, such as credit derivatives and mortgage products). Further, as HFT and ETFs 
have proliferated widely across the financial system in recent years they have become a 
new source of concern for financial regulator. This is highlighted by two recent high 
profile „incidents‟; the UBS ETF „rouge trading‟ scandal and the „flash crash‟ of  2010 
which was associated with HFT.  
 
In the former case, a trader at UBS‟s Delta One exploited lax settlement practices for 
synthetic ETF trades to cover his loss making unauthorised trading activity. The incident 
resulted in an estimated loss of $2.3 billion for UBS. In the latter case, US markets 
experienced extreme volatility on May 6
th
 2010, with equity indices losing 5% of their 
market valued over a 30-minute period. Although the exact cause of the „flash crash‟ is a 
subject of contrasting opinions, many subsequent surveys and reports have blamed the 
event on “over-reliance on computer systems and HFT” (see Kirilenko et al., 2011:2). 
Indeed, the volatility attributed to HFT in equity markets has also become an issue in 
commodity markets as HFT have sought to move into other assets classes (see Diaz-
Rainey et al., 2011) 
 
To summarise, the contribution of the paper is twofold.  First, we review the emerging 
literature on the „dark side‟ of financial innovation and from this classify the negative 
effect of financial innovation (The taxonomy). As noted above, to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first paper to do this.  Second, we apply the taxonomy to the cases 
of  HFT and ETFs in order to understand the types of risks these two important „recent‟ 
innovations pose. In order to achieve this, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
addresses the first research question by developing the taxonomy of the „dark side‟ of 
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financial innovation through a review of related literature. Section 3 introduces the two 
case studies in question (ETFs and HFT). Section 4 tackles the second research question 
by exploring the nature of the risks posed by HFT and ETF through the lens of the 
taxonomy of the „dark side‟ of financial innovation. Section 4 also explores the progress 
made towards the G20 goal to „rein in‟ financial innovation as outlined in the FBS 
recommendation discussed above. Finally, Section 5 contains a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
2 Theoretical context: A taxonomy of the ‘dark side’ of financial innovation 
 
“In this address, I wish to consider financial innovation in the good and in the bad. 
There is much good, as I think we will come to agree. However, some things labelled 
financial innovations have little or no substance when we peel away the veneer, other 
than to their promoters” Van Horne (1985, p.620) 
 
The above quote delivered from the 1984 Presidential Address to the American Finance 
Association by James C. Van Horne highlights how financial innovation has been a 
contentious issue for some time. Van Horne (1985) argues that genuine financial 
innovation is unambiguously a good thing and that it should be distinguished from 
products and services labelled as such but which are just masked efforts to profiteer from 
undiscerning clients. As acknowledged by Van Horne (1985), however, distinguishing 
between the two ex ante is not easy. Accordingly, this section explores two related 
questions: (1) How is financial innovation defined? (2) Can the extant literature on 
financial innovation help identify the characteristics of „bad‟ or „misused‟ financial 
innovations? 
 
 
2.1 What is financial innovation? 
Financial innovation is defined in the literature as the creation and diffusion of new 
financial instruments, technologies, institutions and markets (Allen and Yago 2010; 
Tufano 2003). This is a broad and fairly conventional definition of innovation that 
encompasses the Schumpeterian trilogy of invention, innovation and diffusion. Given the 
nature of the financial sector, financial innovations can characterised as either  
 
“...new products (e.g., adjustable-rate mortgages, exchange-traded index funds); new 
services (e.g., online securities trading, internet banking); new "production" 
processes (e.g., electronic record-keeping for securities, credit scoring); or new 
organizational forms (e.g., a new type of electronic exchange for trading securities, 
internet only banks)” (Frame & White, 2004, p.118).  
 
Furthermore, the literature has also sought to understand the „drivers‟ or motivation for 
financial innovation. The most conventional interpretation for the existence of financial 
innovation is that it comes about as an attempt to overcome market imperfections or 
inefficiencies in the core activity of finance – that is the allocation of capital spatially, 
across time and in a world of uncertainty (see Frame & White, 2004, Henderson & 
Pearson, 2011). Other factors that have been identified in the literature as triggers or 
 environmental factors driving financial innovation include technological change 
(especially ICT technologies), regulatory and political changes (such as efforts in the EU 
to create a single European financial market), changes in taxation, macroeconomic 
changes (such as globalisation) and intellectual breakthroughs (such as the Black-Scholes 
derivative pricing model) (see Frame & White, 2004, Tufano, 2003). 
 
2.2 „The dark side of financial innovation‟ 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the established literature takes a fairly 
benign view of financial innovation. The logic behind this is that such innovations must 
be desirable since both the creators/issuers of the innovation and buyers must benefit in 
some way from the innovation for it to be adopted (otherwise the issuer or the buyer 
would not pursue the innovation) (Allen, 2011, Henderson & Pearson, 2011). A growing 
body of literature, however, challenges this rather „rose tinted‟ view of financial 
innovation. Most of this literature highlights the exploitation of behavioural biases and 
the use of complexity to „fool‟ buyers into purchasing inappropriate products or to make 
them overpay.  
 
In theoretical contributions, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Carlin (2009) show 
respectively that issuers may have incentives to disguise the nature of products so as to 
exploit customers or to increase complexity so as to make it harder for buyers to make 
rational choices. The complementary empirical literature has tended to focus on retail 
consumers. For instance, Ashton and Hudson (2008) building on earlier work by Kahn et 
al., (1999), show that banks pricing (i.e. the interest rate offered) of deposit accounts and 
loans are designed to exploit behavioural biases and cognitive limitations such as 
rounding and truncation. Henderson and Pearson (2011) show that „structured equity 
products‟ (investment vehicles with contingent payoffs) that are popular with US retail 
investors tend to be 8% overpriced relative to their expected risk/return profile. In 
analogous research Bergstresser (2008) obtains similar results for a larger sample of 
equity products from the US, Europe and Asia. Interestingly, Bergstresser (2008) finds 
that some firms overprice more than others implying that it may not be the innovation 
that is predatory per se but it is its use that is predatory. As Van Horne (1985, p.626) puts 
it when distinguishing between predatory schemes and abuse of innovations; “Still other 
ideas have substance, but the promoters have eaten not only the icing of the cake but also 
the cake itself.”  
 
The recent credit crunch highlights a second stream to the „dark side‟ to financial 
innovation literature that focuses on the merits or otherwise of credit and credit derivative 
products.
2
 For instance, an exploration by Miles and Pillonca (2008) of the European 
mortgage market highlights that a lot of recent innovations in the market (lengthened 
terms and interest only mortgages) served simply to allow consumers to overstretch 
themselves. This observation is complemented by a number of theoretical papers 
exploring the potentially negatives welfare effect of credit derivatives. For instance, 
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 See Allen and Yago (2010), Allen (2011), Brunnermeier Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009) 
"Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 
23, No. 1, pp. 77-100. and Mason Mason, J. R. (2008) "The Summer of '07 and the Shortcomings 
of Financial Innovation", Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 8-15. for general 
discussions  
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Morrison (2005) shows that credit derivatives can reduce welfare by reducing incentives 
for banks to monitor loans, while Duffee and Zhou (2001) show that though individually 
beneficial, credit default swaps may have the unintended consequence of undermining the 
loan sales market and thus again reduce welfare.  
 
From a more economy wide perspective, Allen and Carletti (2006) develop a model that 
shows that a potentially unintended consequence of credit derivatives is that they can 
increase the likelihood of financial contagion across sectors, and thus lower economic 
welfare, when financial institutions hold similar assets. Building on this work, Gai et al. 
(2008) show that the combination of financial innovation and greater macroeconomic 
stability may have made financial crises in developed countries less likely than in the past 
but potentially more severe.  
 
As a whole, this literature provides an articulate explanation as to why credit and credit 
derivative innovations did not deliver the risk reductions they promised. More critically 
the literature highlights that financial innovation that is beneficial in an individual context 
may not be so beneficial when placed in the broader context i.e. how the innovation 
interacts with the rest of the financial system may lead to problems and unintended 
consequences. 
 
2.3. Towards a taxonomy of the dark side of financial innovation 
It is safe to say that the credit crunch of 2007-2008 and subsequent economic and 
financial dislocations have given financial innovation a bad name and have led to calls 
for it to be „reined in‟ (See discussion in 1. Introduction). The emotiveness that financial 
innovation engenders has the potential to cloud public policy in this area to be overly 
intrusive or inappropriate. Accordingly, building on the preceding review and in order to 
facilitate a more nuanced treatment of financial innovation we develop a taxonomy of the 
„dark side‟ of financial innovation into three categories (1) predatory schemes (2) abuse 
of financial innovations (3) unintended consequence. In line with Van Horne (1985) all 
three relate to the application of financial innovation rather than the innovation per se. 
These applications of the innovation can be differentiated in terms of their nature;, who 
can benefit from them, the motivation of their instigators and, consequently, how their 
negative effects can be mitigated (See Table 1). Prior to a more general discussion of the 
taxonomy we discuss each component first. 
 
Predatory schemes and associated complexity: This builds on Allen and Yago‟s (2010) 
first „cardinal rule‟ of financial innovation; namely that complexity should not be 
confused with innovation. In this context, the creator of „financial innovation‟ simply 
seeks to profiteer from customers, usually by exploiting complexity and cognitive 
limitations, to deliver a product that has no potential to benefit the customer (See Table 
1). Such schemes should be, and often are, outlawed e.g. ponzi schemes. However, there 
is an identification problem in that predatory schemes may be disguised as genuine 
innovations through the use of complexity. To overcome this, a licensing type regime for 
financial innovations could help to disentangle the good from the bad ex ante. Indeed, 
Ashton and Dewing (2011) use a drug licensing analogy to advocate such a regime in 
financial services. How such a regime would work in practice is difficult to foresee.  
Further, it could act as a disincentive or „barrier to entry‟ to genuine innovations, so more 
 conventionally such practices are dealt with the enactment and enforcement of laws ex 
post.  
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Table 1: The Taxonomy and its Application to HFT and ETF 
  
Taxonomy Nature of activity Beneficiary Motivation Mitigation Application to HFT 
(See Section 3.2 & 4.1) 
Application to ETF 
(See Section 3.1 & 4.1) 
Predatory 
Schemes 
Innovation is used to 
commit illegal action or 
defraud 
Asymmetric: Only 
those creating the 
scheme can benefit 
(Predatory) 
Profiteering Licensing of 
innovations; 
enactment and 
enforcement of laws 
to make the practice 
illegal; corporate 
governance 
HFT practices of  
„spoofing‟ and 
„quote stuffing‟ to 
gain unfair 
advantage over other 
market participants 
Using ETFs for 
insider trading or 
unauthorised trading 
(presumably for 
personal gain i.e. 
maintain or increase 
bonuses) 
Abuse of 
innovation 
Innovation is used in an 
inappropriate or 
unethical manner (e.g. 
Mis-selling) 
Asymmetric: Value of 
the innovation goes 
disproportionately to 
the creator or seller of 
the innovation 
(abusive) 
Misplaced 
incentives; 
Selling 
through agents 
Conduct of business 
regulation; corporate 
governance 
 Mis-selling of 
synthetic ETFs to 
retail customers 
without explaining 
associated risks 
Unintended 
consequences 
Legitimate use of the 
innovation, however, 
interaction of the 
innovation with the 
broader financial 
system or the economy 
can create problem 
Both the creator and 
purchaser of the 
innovation have a „fair‟  
chance of benefitting  
Benign (i.e. 
not abusive or 
predatory) 
profit 
maximising 
use of the 
innovation 
Licensing of 
innovations; Policies 
resulting from 
independent analysis 
of systemic 
implication of new 
financial innovation 
As the flash crash 
showed the „benign‟ 
presence of HFT in 
markets can 
exacerbate and 
accelerate financial 
stress 
ETFs have been 
associated with 
„speculation‟ in 
commodity markets 
leading to 
macroeconomic 
consequence (higher 
inflation) 
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Abuse of financial innovations: In this case the financial innovation has merit in that it 
addresses a market failure or a necessary function of finance (See Section 2.1), however, 
malfeasance, inappropriate incentives and or low levels of education by sellers may lead 
to the abuse of the innovation (it‟s inappropriate use). Good examples of this are self-
certification mortgages (where little or no proof of income was needed) which were 
designed to give the recently self-employed access to housing finance. But advisors sold 
self-certification mortgages to those employed as a way to get around income multiples 
restriction on conventional home loans. Moreover these sales agents were principally 
concerned with their commission and gave little consideration to the suitability of their 
products. This lead to loans being issued that could not be afforded by their recipients.  
 
These mis-selling problems, which are associated with sales agents faced with 
inappropriate incentives, have been widely recognised in the finance literature (see for 
instance (see for instance Black & Nobles, 1998, Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009). Further, 
they appear to have become more pronounced as finance has moved away from a 
relationship based model and towards an „originate and distribute‟ transactions based 
model (Brunnermeier, 2009). These mis-selling problems are classic „conduct of 
business‟ financial regulation problems which can generally be overcome by monitoring 
and compliance (See Table 1). However, in some cases more fundamental regulatory-
induced restructuring of business models may be needed to eradicate the most persistent 
and pronounced inappropriate incentives. 
 
Unintended consequences of financial innovation: In this case, as in the previous one, the 
financial innovation has merit in that it addresses a market failure or a necessary function 
of finance but only at the consumer level (the firm or individual purchasing it). At the 
aggregate level (the financial system; economy-wide), however, the innovation may have 
damaging unintended and even ultimately welfare destroying consequences (See Table 
1). The literature on credit derivatives discussed in Section 2.2. eloquently highlighted 
this possibility – at the firm level they could be used legitimately to hedge or shift risk 
but at the aggregate they had the impact of augmenting financial contagion. These 
unintended consequences are arguably the hardest ones for policymakers to deal with for 
two main reasons.  
 
First, it might involve the difficult task of curtailing or banning innovations that at the 
individual level have merit. This is likely to make regulators very unpopular and open to 
accusations of an anti-innovation bias. Second, knowing the unintended consequence ex 
ante may be challenging and open to protracted debate. However, it is noteworthy that 
the papers by Allen and Carletti (2006), Duffee and Zhou (2001) and Morrison (2005) all 
pre-dated the credit crunch so at least some researchers were able to see the potential 
unintended consequences of credit derivatives. Whatever the challenges involved, it is 
clear that the FSB (2008, p.40) was right to recommend that regulators „have the requisite 
resources and expertise to  oversee the risks associated with financial innovation‟ (See 1 
Introduction). Whether this should involve the establishment of new committees, the 
hiring of new personnel or the development of a licensing regime for financial innovation 
(see discussion above, Ashton & Dewing, 2011 and Table 1) remains a moot point. (The 
various interpretations by G20 countries to this FSB recommendation will be discussed in 
Section 4.2).      
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The taxonomy of the „dark side‟ of financial innovation discussed above can also be 
understood by way of analogy with illegal recreational and prescription drugs use – In 
this we were inspired by Ashton and Dewing (2011)‟s related medical analogy. 
Unintended consequence can be seen as unanticipated side effect from a prescription drug 
that cures a well diagnosed illness. Predatory Schemes could be viewed as analogous to 
the use of illegal recreational drugs. Users may feel good temporarily but ultimately the 
only winner is the „pusher‟ of the drugs. Abuse of innovation could be seen as analogous 
to the use or abuse of prescription drugs for recreational purposes or the overmedication 
of patients by doctors whom are over-incentivised by pharmaceutical companies.  
 
In the case of drugs, legislation and regulation can curtail illegal drug use and the abuse 
of prescription drugs, but it cannot eliminate it entirely. This is likely to be true of the 
dark side of financial innovation and calls for a wider examination of the context and 
motivations driving the undesirable consequences. There appears to be no literature that 
explicitly addresses the motivation question in the context of financial innovation, 
nevertheless the literature on white collar and financial crime may have some useful 
lessons (see for instance Hansen, 2009, Nie, 2009, Tibbs et al., 2011). Clearly the main 
reason for predatory schemes and abuse of financial innovation is personal gain in some 
way (See Table 1). Interestingly, Tibbs et al. (2011) investigate the return effect of 
corporate misconduct and find a net benefit to shareholders from misconduct (i.e. the 
positive abnormal stock returns during the pre-discovery period are only partially 
reversed during the post-discovery period). Their evidence points to the need to ensure 
that punishment for undesirable behaviours are punitive enough to more than cancel out 
ill-gotten gains. This should apply to individual gains just as much as it should apply to 
firm profits and would accordingly ensure a strong future disincentive. On the more 
general corporate governance side Nie (2009) finds that firms not involved in securities 
fraud (versus those that were) tended to have more outsiders on their boards, the 
management teams had longer tenures and were more likely to own equity in the 
business. These insights point to corporate governance considerations (see Table 1 and 
Hansen, 2009) being an important and complementary weapon to regulatory efforts 
(including punitive sanctions) in the „war‟ against the dark side of financial innovation.   
3 Case Studies: Exchange Traded Funds and High Frequency Trading 
This section contains the case studies of two relatively recent financial innovations; ETF 
and HFT. For each we provide a description of the innovation and examples of associated 
risks. This overview of ETFs and HFT will allow for a discussion of their regulatory 
implication in Section 4.  
 
3.1 Exchange Traded Funds 
ETFs constitute an alternative form of investment; they track market indexes by 
replicating an index basket. ETFs are not perfect substitutes for conventional open-ended 
index funds such as unit trusts or mutual funds (see Agapova, 2011). As physical ETFs 
usually hold only a weighted representative sample of the index they track and are traded 
like stocks on exchanges (akin to close-ended funds like investment trusts), they provide 
a level of diversification similar to mutual funds while retaining the immediacy of 
transactions (liquidity) and lower trading costs of exchange traded securities (see among 
 others Boehmer & Boehmer, 2003, Deville, 2008, Gastineau, 2002, Gastineau, 2004). 
Thus ETFs can be used as cost effective and liquid hedging instrument or investment 
vehicles. In the latter case in particular, they allow retail investors access to a wider range 
of assets classes, thereby allowing them to potentially benefit from diversification into 
asset classes hitherto unavailable to them. From a risk perspective well-diversified 
physically delivered ETFs should pose no bigger risk to the financial system than the 
indexes they track. However, the pace of innovation in financial services, as well as 
liberal regulatory environment in Europe, has led to the development of a riskier ETF, the 
so-called “synthetic” ETFs.  
 
Synthetic ETFs provide returns relative to indexes as well but do not reconstitute the 
indexes they track; instead they execute an OTC (Over-the-Counter) derivatives asset 
swap with a counterparty who undertakes to provide the index returns. According to a 
report of the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2011), in Europe, they currently account for 
about 45% of the ETF market, fuelled by the fact that derivatives desks of large banks 
can act as counterparties to the investment or asset management divisions of the same 
banks selling ETF. Physical ETFs do not always deliver promised index return due to 
tracking error related to the cost of trading the underlying securities while synthetic ETFs 
offer the potential to perfectly match the index. This potential performance and hedging 
superiority of synthetic ETFs comes at the cost of counterparty risk i.e. the risk that the 
counterparty promising to deliver the index return becomes insolvent. Further, the risks 
posed by synthetic ETFs are larger in that they can potentially encourage the matching of 
securities with differing (inferior) liquidity - an issue that may only become apparent 
during financial turmoil when less liquid assets tend to be sold at deep discounts. The 
IMF has been keen to highlight that this practice poses risks of systemic proportions to 
the financial sector.
3
  
 
Other issues causing regulators to be concerned about ETFs generally include securities 
settlement practices, the use of leverage and the creation of ETFs investing in other asset 
classes, including debt and commodities.  
 
Examples of Associated Risks 
The recent rogue trading scandal at UBS‟s Delta One derivatives desk highlighted the lax 
settlement practices in ETF trading in Europe. The trader involved, Mr. Kweku Adoboli 
had exploited the lax settlement requirements for synthetic ETF trades to cover his loss 
making investments far longer than should have been possible in today‟s lightening fast 
financial transactions environment. The unauthorised trading activity led to a loss of an 
estimated $2.3 billion for UBS. Mr. Adoboli‟s loss making trades were not ETFs, 
however, he took advantage of the fact that synthetic ETF trades in Europe can be settled 
after the conventional three day lag required for most derivative trades, to set up spurious 
forward settling cash ETF positions as a hedge against his original bets. Also, the trades 
do not have to be confirmed until settlement; hence proceeds from these trades can be 
                                                 
3 „IMF raises concerns about ETF systemic risks‟ Financial Times, 13 April 2011. Available from 
http://www.ft.com. Accessed 10/12/11. 
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acknowledged on a trader‟s books as if they have in effect been delivered in anticipation 
of the delivery.
4
 
 
The UBS scandal is not the only instance of impropriety involving ETFs. According to 
Conroy et al. (2011), a former Goldman Sachs trader has recently been accused of insider 
trading in regards to ETFs. Traders can exploit private information to indulge in ETF 
stripping, taking long (short) positions on specific constituent stocks of ETFs based on 
the information they hold. A further concern is that the creation of commodities ETFs is 
contributing to „speculation‟ in commodities markets leading to inflated prices of basic 
commodities such as food and energy (see amongst others Diaz-Rainey et al. 2011). 
 
As noted earlier, despite these problems the open-ended (potential for low cost 
diversification) and close-ended (high liquidity) features of ETFs make them attractive 
investment vehicles and hedging instruments (see Fuller, 2008), hence their continued 
growth. Growing at an estimated annual rate of 40%, the global ETF market in 2010 
surpassed the 1 trillion dollar mark (FSB, 2011). The market has progressed in both 
complexity and diversity, with several variants of the original fund being floated. There 
are now leveraged, inverse and leveraged-inverse ETFs as well as ETF-styled debt 
securities, Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs) and Exchange Traded Vehicles ETVs (FSB, 
2011). Recent events, growing product complexly, the risk of contagion effects and the 
uncertainty about interactions with other financial innovations (e.g. algorithmic trading) 
all underscore the heightened concerns of regulators about ETFs.  
 
3.2 High Frequency Trading 
Technological improvements and innovations in financial market trading platforms since 
the late 1980s have gradually altered the way markets operate and how prices of 
securities are determined. Technology is now a very important determinant of asset price 
discovery process (see among others Barclay & Hendershott, 2003, Barclay et al., 1990, 
Chan et al., 1995, Easley et al., 1996, Easley et al., 1997, Flood et al., 1999, Hendershott 
et al., 2011, Hendershott & Riordan, 2011). The advent of high frequency trading/traders 
(HFT) or algorithmic trading (AT) has seen the gradual erosion of the classic floor 
trading by computer algorithm controlled trading. The algorithm has now replaced the 
judgement of the floor trader, previously coveted in the execution of limit orders in order 
to avoid driving prices („moving the market‟) as a result of his or her trades. Algorithms 
now determine the optimal conditions for executing trades, this includes, the quantity to 
execute, the venue, the timing and order routing. This is done while constantly 
monitoring market environment across many platforms, securities and their limit order 
book, to guard against them becoming stale.  
 
Hendershott et al. (2011) suggest that the introduction of HFT has improved trading 
quality through decline in trading (including adverse selection) costs and improved 
informativeness of quotes. These effects of algorithmic trading have resulted in the 
enhancement of liquidity over time on most platforms. The positive impacts of HFT on 
                                                 
4 For more details see „The fine line between bad luck and rogue trades‟, CNN Money, 27 
September 2011 (Available from http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ Accessed 10/12/11.) 
and „Delta One forced out of the shadows‟ and „UBS trader Adoboli held over US$2bn loss‟, 
Financial Times, 15 September 2011 (Both available from http://www.ft.com. Accessed 10/12/11.) 
 liquidity provision are such that market inefficiencies are far less common. Daily serial 
correlations on platforms with HFT activity have seldom been more than zero and short-
horizon deviations from random walk benchmarks are quite rare. Increasingly, markets 
are now reliant on HFT systems as market makers; however, these systems do not 
conform to the traditional norms of market making (see Easley et al., 2011, Kirilenko et 
al., 2011, Menkveld, 2011).  
 
Examples of Associated Risks 
For all the advantages of seeding control of trading decisions to algorithms, there are 
fundamental shortfalls of the system as well. No event illustrates this point better than the 
extreme volatility event of May 6
th
 2010, the so-called „flash crash‟ (see Easley et al., 
2011, Kirilenko et al., 2011). During a 30-minute period on that day, U.S. equity indices 
had about 5% of their market value wiped-out, only to rebound after the half-hour period. 
According to CFTC-SEC (2010) report on the event, many of the nearly 8,000 stocks and 
ETFs trading on the day were affected by the wild swing. Surveys conducted since then 
have blamed the event on “over-reliance on computer systems and HFT” and many 
believe this could happen again (see Kirilenko et al., 2011:2). 
 
HFT generates massive amounts of liquidity for U.S. platforms. On 6
th
 May 2010, 
according to CFTC-SEC (2010), reductions in liquidity induced execution of trades at 
preposterous prices, some as high as $100,000.00 and others as low as 1cent a share. At 
the time of the crash, U.S. securities indices were already down over 4% on the day 
creating a rather volatile and uncertain trading environment. It was in this environment 
that a fundamental trader decided to execute a 75,000 E-mini contract (worth about $4.1 
billion) sell order. The algorithm used was programmed to target volume and not price or 
time. The order executed rapidly in 20 minutes, triggering a series of intensive liquidity 
driven HFT trading manoeuvres which led to the flash crash. Two orders of similar sizes 
within the 12 months preceding 6 May, 2010 had taken about five hours to execute, using 
a combination of manual and algorithms targeting volume, price and time.  
 
Easley et al. (2011), take a narrower microstructure view of the crash, attributing it to 
market toxicity (anticipated losses attributable to adverse selection costs) arising as a 
result of loss of market liquidity. Programmed market makers, taking very low inventory 
positions as a hedge against inventory costs, when confronted with order flow toxicity, 
will attempt to cut their losses by liquidating their assets, hence turning into consumers of 
liquidity rather than providers. With liquidity gone, and a programmed goal of cutting 
losses, the programmes traded at best market prices, hence the flash crash. Kirilenko et 
al. (2011) agree that HFT traders aggressively mopped up liquidity to retain target 
inventory levels during the crash; they suggest that this trading pattern aggravated the 
wild swing in prices. They disagree with the CFTC-SEC (2010) report on the role of HFT 
algorithms in the crash. While HFT activity worsened the situation, it could not have 
triggered it without changing their already programmed trading strategies. 
 
Irrespective of the views of sources on the event of 6
th
 May, one thing is clear, high 
frequency traders contributed in some way to the flash crash, and this can happen again. 
In no way should the short-term liquidity they provide be misconstrued as helping to 
smooth out volatility. Volatility grows with growing HFT activity (see Brogaard, 2011, 
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Zhang, 2010). The volatility attributed to HFT in equity markets has also become an issue 
in commodity markets as HFT have sought to move into other assets classes (see Diaz-
Rainey et al., 2011 and Footnote 8). Further, regulators have become concerned with 
manipulative practice by HFT such as „layering‟, „spoofing‟ and „quote stuffing‟.5 These 
practices potentially disrupt pricing efficiency and are thus dimly viewed by the 
authorities. For example, spoofing which involves submitting bids and offers with the 
absolute intention to cancel them before execution, tampers with the price discovery 
process. Since the price formation process is dependent on orderflow, a compromised 
order process reveals an inaccurate aggregation of trading intentions. The Dodd-Frank 
legislation thus empowers the CFTC to make regulations to discourage practices such as 
spoofing. 
 
4. Application of the taxonomy: Regulatory implications of HFT and ETF  
 
As noted in the Introduction, both HFT and ETFs epitomise modern „high speed‟ finance. 
They have been enabled by financial deregulation and by rapid technological change in 
finance. Both innovations have virtue; they offer potential societal benefits in terms of 
greater market efficiency (HFT) and more effective diversification (ETFs) yet as noted in 
the preceding discussion both innovations pose considerable and contrasting risks. 
Accordingly, Section 4.1 articulates these risks through the lens of the taxonomy of the 
„dark side‟ of financial innovation developed earlier. Section 4.2 draws on a G20 survey 
of member countries to discuss the ability/capabilities of financial regulators to deal with 
the risks associated with financial innovation. 
 
4.1 The „dark side‟ of HFT and ETFs 
 
It is evident that both HFT and ETF are complex financial innovations. ETFs are an 
example of a product innovation while HFT can best be understood as a disruptive 
innovation that is both a new production process and new organisational form (See Frame 
and White, 2004 and Section 2.1). The complexity of both innovations mean variants of 
them might be constructed so as to create predatory schemes (see Table 1). The use of 
ETFs to conceal insider dealing and HFTs for „spoofing‟ other computers into trading 
losses are relevant examples of how both innovations can be used to create predatory 
schemes (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). The latter case in particular shows the 
challenges regulators face in detecting predatory schemes. Determining whether an 
algorithm is predatory is extremely difficult given the speed of trading, the proliferation 
of alternative trading venues and since HFT firms guard their algorithms jealously (they 
are after all their competitive raison d'être).
6
 Such challenges call for enhanced market 
                                                 
5
 Layering, spoofing and quote stuffing all refer to order placement practices aimed at gaining 
fraudulent advantage over other traders. Layering involves submitting orders aimed at baiting 
simulated reactions from other trading algorithms; the elicited reactions are aimed at providing 
arbitrage opportunities. Quote stuffing refers to flooding of the exchange with orders which are 
quickly pulled to gain a price edge over rivals by slowing their computers down.  
6
 See for instance „High-frequency trading raises concerns at SEC‟, Washington Post, 22 February 
2012 (Available www.washingtonpost.com from. Accessed 07/03/12.) and „Subpoenas Go Out to 
High-Speed Trade Firms‟, The Wall Street Journal 8 August 2011(Available from www.wsj.com 
Accessed 07/03/12.) 
 monitoring capabilities and perhaps new powers (for instance the right to inspect 
algorithms or have algorithms approved or licensed prior to deployment).  
 
With ETFs there is a clear danger of abuse of financial innovation occurring. This is 
common in financial innovations that have genuine merit and can be sold to retail 
investors (see Table 1). Influential industry insiders have vocally expressed that ETFs, 
and especially synthetic ETFs, are being mis-sold to retail investors whom have poor or 
no appreciation of the risk involved in their investment (this is particularly true if 
counterparty risk becomes an issue for a synthetic ETF).
7
 There is a danger here that 
predatory and mis-sold (i.e. abuse of financial innovation) ETFs could undermine ETFs 
more generally. The issue seems to be particularly acute in Europe because there is a 
more liberal approach to what can be contained in collective investment vehicles relative 
to the US. Hence in Europe the relevant regulation allows ETFs to use derivatives within 
certain limits for both hedging and investment purposes (FSB, 2011). In response to these 
concerns ESMA, one of the new European-wide financial regulators discussed earlier, 
has recently issued a discussion paper to explore the risk associated with the selling of 
complex ETFs to retail investors as part of its role of  monitoring the impact of financial 
innovation on financial markets (ESMA, 2011).  
 
How effectively ESMA will be able to identify and mitigate associated risk in the context 
of a single European market for financial services that spans multiple languages and 
national jurisdiction remains a moot point. The rogue trading scandal at UBS‟s Delta One 
derivatives desk, where lax settlement practices in ETF trading in Europe were exploited, 
highlights how regulations and regulators have found it difficult to keep up with rapid 
innovation in the ETFs market. This once more highlights the issue of adequate 
regulatory resources to understand and monitor the risks associated with financial 
innovation. 
 
Finally, both ETFs and HFTs pose risks in terms of the unintended consequences of 
financial innovation (see Table 1). One example has been already alluded to in Section 
3.1; namely that investment in commodities ETFs could contribute to a spike, for 
example in energy prices, with negative macroeconomic consequences. Another 
possibility relates to the interaction of HFT and ETFs and systemic risk. The collapse of a 
major Synthetic ETF swap counterparty (usually an investment bank) could lead to the 
sale of ETFs and in the underlying markets they track (equities, debt securities or 
commodities) that might be amplified or accelerated by HFT. The intervention of HFTs 
would narrow the window of opportunity for regulators and central banks to intervene to 
avoid widespread contagion.
8
  
 
Indeed the „flash crash‟ underscored how dependent the markets have become on HFT 
for price discovery and therefore how HFT can exaggerate market crashes by 
                                                 
7
 „Trillion-dollar danger of „untested‟ funds‟, The Guardian, 16 December 2011, p.36 
8
 A recent example of the interaction between HFT and ETFs was the spike in oil prices and 
associated market uncertainty caused by a trading algorithm going wrong at Infinium Capital 
Management. The algorithm exploited arbitrage opportunities between an oil ETF and the oil 
futures market. See „Exclusive: Firm faces civil charges for U.S. oil trading mayhem‟, Reuters, 25 
August 2010, Available from http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/.  Accessed 15/12/11. 
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withdrawing liquidity (something they are fully entitled to do as they have no obligation 
to make markets) during times of financial stress (See Section 3.2 and Table 1). In 
response to such systemic fears, the recently proposed revision to the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (known MIFID II) seeks to formally regulate HFT in 
Europe to ensure they have adequate risk management measures in place, they provide 
liquidity irrespective of market conditions and their actions are transparent. Further, there 
is currently a proposal in Europe to introduce a financial transactions tax that could, 
depending on its size, drive HFTs out of the market since they make their profits from 
high speed, high volume but low margin trades. This may mitigate some of the risk 
associated with HFT but it may come at too high a cost since, as noted earlier, the 
emergence of HFT has contributed to the provision of liquidity and by extension market 
efficiency. High frequency traders/algorithmic traders can be vigilant market participants 
and can therefore identify deviations from underlying worth. The issue is therefore, how 
to harness the positive aspects of this HFT and tame its negative consequences? In this 
respect it will be interesting to see how MIFID II will seek to ensure that HFT provide 
liquidity irrespective of market conditions. 
 
Limitations of time, space and resources meant that from the short proceeding 
discussions detailed policy recommendations with respect to HFT and ETFs could not, 
and should not, be made. These are complex innovations with related regulations subject 
to protracted consultations which are in turn associated with intense lobbying and 
difficult trade-offs. Moreover, both innovations are continuing to evolve rapidly so a 
more pertinent question in the more general endeavour of this paper (of developing a 
taxonomy of the dark side of financial innovation) is whether regulators have the ability 
to deal with the negative consequences of financial innovations as these innovations 
emerge and evolve.  
 
4.2. Mitigating the risk of financial innovation: Evidence from the G20 
 
These cases HFT and ETF do highlight that, as recommended by the G20 and the 
Financial Stability Board, countries need to ensure that financial regulators „have the 
requisite resources and expertise to oversee the risks associated with financial innovation‟ 
(see FSF, 2008 and 1. Introduction). This recommendation eventually became one of the 
various reform recommendations that the FSB has been monitoring through the FSB 
Implementation Monitoring Network which surveys G20 member‟s progress on reforms. 
Table 2 provides a summary of a selected group of G20 countries self-reported progress 
towards achieving this particular goal.  
 
From Table 2 it is clear that efforts to strengthen regulatory capabilities with respect to 
financial innovations are at an early stage of development and have been subject to 
differing interpretations amongst G20 member countries. For instance, some countries 
have emphasised recruitment and training of supervisory staff (Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Spain and the UK) while others have established new committees or departments to deal 
specifically with financial innovation or new financial products (China, France, the EU 
and the Netherlands). Further highlighting differences some countries interpret the 
FSB/G20 recommendation as an issue related to banking (Italy) while other countries 
emphasise the risks to retail investors (France) or emphasised macro-prudential risks 
 (Japan). Since risks from financial innovation are relevant to all of these, there appears to 
be a failure to address the issue in a thematic and comprehensive manner.  
 
Arguably the most robust efforts to establish dedicated capabilities to address risks from 
financial innovation have been at the EU level. As noted in the Introduction, in Europe a 
new regulatory architecture termed the „European System of Financial Supervisors‟ 
(ESFS) has been established. The ESFS includes three new Europe-wide regulators for 
banking (the European Banking Authority or EBA), insurance and pensions (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority or EIOPA) and for financial markets 
(European Securities and Markets Authority or ESMA).
9
  
 
The EU has required its three new EU-wide regulators (EBA, ESMA and EIOPA) to 
establish committees to monitor financial innovation. As a result, ESMA has established 
the Financial Innovation Standing Committee and EIOPA has set up the Committee on 
Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation. Further, the EU claims to have the 
powers to prohibit or temporarily ban innovations that „threaten the orderly functioning 
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial 
system in the EU‟ (See Table 2). The US‟s unenlightening response of “on-going” in its 
response to the G20 survey on this goal might hint at a lack of co-ordination, impetus or 
specific focus amongst US policymakers.  
 
It should be noted, however, that Table 2 only presents the evidence for a selected group 
of G20 countries and presents the countries self-reported responses to one of many 
questions related to regulatory reform in the context of a whole host of FSB/G20 
recommendations. There is, therefore, a need to analyse these responses in a more 
systematic fashion and in the context of wider reform initiatives. The evidence presented 
in Table 2 would suggest, however, that the FSB/G20 recommendation with respect to 
financial innovation has not been central to governments‟ efforts to reform the financial 
architecture. This is surprising since, as noted in the Introduction, risks associated with 
financial innovations were identified as one of the principal culprits in creating the „credit 
crunch‟ and subsequent economic malaise.   
                                                 
9
 In addition, there is also a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) under the responsibility of the 
European Central Bank tasked with macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system. These 
new institutions are to co-ordinate regulatory efforts with domestic regulators and represent a major 
shift in regulatory power toward EU institutions.   
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Table 2. G20 Resources and Expertise to Oversee the Risks of Financial Innovation for Selected Countries
10
 
Country Progress to date 
China The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has established a department to regulate financial innovation and made it clear that commercial 
banks should be well informed of their counterparties, businesses and risks, and estimate related costs. The CBRC has issued rules on conducting 
prudential regulation over specific businesses, to guide banking financial institutions, including the Guidance on Financial Innovation of Commercial 
Banks and Guidance for Supervision and Management of Asset Backed Securitisation. In accordance with the Securities Law and the Regulation on 
the Supervision and Administration of Securities Companies, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) fulfils the responsibility of 
supervision and administration of securities companies. Securities companies and their domestic subsidiaries shall not be engaged in a certain business 
unless approved by the CSRC. In order to effectively control risks, the financial innovation of securities companies should also be supervised by the 
CSRC. 
France The AMF has also established a new Retail Investors Relations Division in charge of monitoring marketing campaigns and new products being offered 
to investors. Specific attention is being devoted to complex products. The AMF is also taking actions, in application of the Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) directive and later of the AIFM directive, to ensure fund managers have sufficient resources and 
valuation tools to correctly understand and control the risks associated with investment strategies. 
Germany BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank have implemented personnel policies allowing the recruitment of highly qualified supervisors. They provide and 
permanently develop training programs. BaFin and Bundesbank have, for example, initiated in 2009 a European-wide training network called the 
“European Supervisor Education Initiative”. With regard to institutions, German supervisors require firms to have adequately trained and experienced 
staff with regard to their competencies and responsibilities within the firm. This requirement is part of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
assessment. The existent supervisory standards already provide for measures to ensure that firms only invest in products if they have the capacity to 
understand and manage the associated risks. 
Italy The Bank of Italy stuck to its efforts to improve its staff expertise in risk oversight. Overall, about 1,700 personnel units – equal to 3,800 working days 
– attended training initiatives focused on: procedures for the assessment of intermediaries‟ risk profile; methods for the analysis of the ICAAP 
produced by the intermediaries; recent changes in the reporting system. Where necessary, banks are formally warned and urged to take prompt 
corrective actions. Supervisory meetings with the bank management (e.g. CEO, Audit, Risk Management etc) or, if deemed appropriate, inspections 
may be arranged. An extensive training programme focused on Solvency II issues is underway. It includes a basic course on fundamental issues as 
well as an advanced course for actuaries and other skilled staff.  
                                                 
10
 Compiled from G20 country responses to Question 12 of survey monitoring progress made in implementing recommended reforms. Submitted to the G20 
Cannes Summit in November 2011. See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104.htm Accessed 9/12/2011. 
 Japan The Financial Services agency (FSA) established a specialized office that collects and analyzes information related to financial system risks and is 
trying to advance risk analysis. Besides cultivating and utilizing staffs‟ expertise internally, the FSA and Bank of Japan (BOJ) have employed 
professionals actively from the private sector (including system/market risk experts, actuaries, lawyers and public certified accountants) In order to 
respond properly to sophistication and complication of financial activities, the FSA and BOJ have conducted effective and efficient inspection and/or 
the supervision through collecting information and analyzing the condition of the macro economy and each market such as the stock or bond market in 
addition to employment and cultivation of staff with a high level of expertise. The FSA and BOJ believe that these efforts had certain effects on 
encouraging financial institutions to enhance their risk management. 
Netherlands In its supervisory approach, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) has enlarged its focus to address governance and business models of financial institutions, 
including evaluations of suitability of board members and board effectiveness. The EBA has set up a permanent committee to discuss and evaluate 
financial innovation. 
Spain Spanish approach to financial supervision is its proximity close and intensive.  Supervisory staff includes lawyers, economists, accountants, and other 
experts in specific banking areas (risk models, IT systems…). There is in place a rigorous program of ongoing education.  
Switzerland Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is operating qualified and experienced risk departments directly overseeing the risk of large 
banks and insurances. Other institutions are covered by an early warning system as described below and are regularly reviewed by external auditors 
directly reporting to FINMA (dualistic supervision). The procedure proved to be effective. It helps to concentrate supervisory resources, while at the 
same time making sure that issues get recognized and addressed within the continual supervision process. 
United 
Kingdom 
The Financial Services Authority‟s (FSA) continue to focus on the recruitment and retention of high-quality staff. The average number of full-time 
equivalent employees for 2011/10 was 3,291, up from 2,952 during the previous period. This increase in resources is associated with a revised 
regulatory philosophy and operating model. The new, outcomes-based approach recognises that the FSA will intervene in a proactive way when it 
believes that the results of a firm‟s actions will pose risks to its statutory objectives. In its June 2011 consultation document, the Government set out 
further detail of plans to create a Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), to ensure that a new, more judgement-focused approach to regulation of 
firms is adopted so that business models can be challenged, risks identified and action taken to preserve stability. The Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority have published two documents setting out further information about the PRA‟s proposed approach to banking supervision 
(May 2011) and insurance supervision (June 2011). The Government aims to ensure the passage of the necessary primary legislation in 2012. 
United States Ongoing 
European Union Creation of the three supervisory authorities in the EU. These are obliged to monitor new financial products, and create a committee on financial 
innovation, which brings together all relevant competent national supervisory authorities with a view to achieving a coordinated approach to the 
regulatory and supervisory treatment of new or innovative financial activities. They may also temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities 
that threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the EU.  
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5 Conclusions 
The first half of this paper developed a taxonomy of the „dark side‟ of financial 
innovation that categorised the negative effects of financial innovation as (1) predatory 
schemes (2) abuse of financial innovation and (3) unintended consequences of financial 
innovation. The contribution of the taxonomy is to facilitate a more nuanced treatment of 
the negative consequences financial innovation. In the second half of the paper, the 
taxonomy was applied to the cases of two recent financial innovations (exchange traded 
funds or ETFs and high frequency trading or HFT) that have attracted interest from 
financial regulators who are concerned by the risk they may pose to the financial system 
and to the orderly operation of financial markets. We explored these risks with examples 
and in the context of current efforts to reform financial regulation following the 2007-
2008 „credit crunch‟. In the latter case, we drew on a G20 survey that explored the 
capabilities of regulators to mitigate the negative effects of financial innovation. 
 
Overall, we concluded that both innovations are genuine innovations that offer potential 
societal benefits of greater market efficiency (HFT) and more effective diversification 
(ETF); however, both innovations pose considerable and contrasting risks. A limitation of 
our research is that a qualitative analysis like this cannot yield answers as to whether the 
negative aspects of EFT and HFT outweigh the positives. Accordingly, the paper does 
not suggest that these innovations fall or don‟t fall on the „dark side‟ of financial 
innovations in some type of dichotomous rule. The taxonomy does, however, help us 
identify the types of risks that may arise from these innovations.  
 
With respect to ETFs all three components of the taxonomy were relevant but perhaps the 
ones that should have the greatest risk weighting related to abuse of innovation (i.e. the 
apparent mis-selling of synthetic ETFs to retail customers without explaining associated 
risks) and unintended consequences (their implication for speculation in commodity 
markets and in terms of contagion in times of financial stress) (see Table 1, Section 3.1. 
and Section 4.1). In terms of HFT, two of the components of the taxonomy are relevant: 
predatory schemes and unintended consequences (see Table 1, Section 3.2. and Section 
4.1). In the former case, regulators are clearly concerned about practices such as 
„spoofing‟ and „quote stuffing‟ but are finding it difficult to identify concrete cases and 
take mitigating actions given current resource constraints and powers. In the latter case, it 
is clear that market efficiency/liquidity benefits of HFT come at a price. The price is 
higher volatility especially during times of financial stress as epitomised by the „flash 
crash‟. By ensuring HFT provide liquidity to the market irrespective to market 
conditions, the EU‟s proposed reform of the MIFID regulation purports to harness the 
positives and eliminate the negatives of HFT. How this is actually going to be achieved, 
in the context of increasingly integrated international financial markets, remains to be 
seen.  
 
Limitations of time, space and resources meant that detailed policy recommendations 
with respect to HFT and ETFs were not made. As noted earlier these are complex 
innovations that are evolving rapidly, so it is unsurprising that related regulations are 
subject to protracted consultations with intense lobbying and difficult trade-offs. The case 
 studies of HFT and ETF do, however, appear to vindicate the recommendation by the 
G20 and the Financial Stability Board that countries need to ensure that financial 
regulators „have the requisite resources and expertise to oversee the risks associated with 
financial innovation‟ (see FSF, 2008 and 1. Introduction).  The analysis of the G20 
survey of regulatory capabilities discussed in Section 4 and depicted in Table 2 highlights 
differing concerns and emphases about the risks posed by financial innovation among the 
G20 member countries. More generally, the evidence presented in Table 2 would suggest 
that the FSB/G20 recommendation with respect to financial innovation has been given a 
low priority by member countries or is not being tackled in a thematic and comprehensive 
fashion. However, as noted earlier, Table 2 only provides a snapshot of what is going on 
in reform processes so there is a need for further research to ascertain exactly what 
countries are actually doing to tackle the „dark side‟ of financial innovation.  
 
Finally, even though enhanced regulatory capabilities with respect to the negative aspects 
of financial innovation are clearly desirable, they should not be seen as the only avenue to 
mitigating these risks.  The literature on white collar and financial crime suggests that 
corporate governance considerations represent a complementary approach to mitigating 
the negative consequences of financial innovation (see Section 2, Hansen 2009; Nie 
2009). In particular, Nie (2009)‟s results (that firms not involved in securities fraud, 
versus those that were, tended to have more outsiders on their boards, the management 
teams had longer tenures and were more likely to own equity in the business) suggest that 
a lot can be done at the firm level to ensure individual firms employ financial innovations 
in a responsible, ethical and law-abiding manner.  
 
Nie (2009)‟s research, however, was not specifically focussed on financial services firms, 
nor was it framed within the context of financial innovation. Accordingly, there is a clear 
need to explore whether these findings are still valid in this more specific context. Other 
avenues for further research are also apparent from the preceding discussions. There is 
clearly a need to survey retail ETF investors to assess the degree to which they 
understand the risks they are taking, especially in terms of synthetic ETFs. In addition, 
modelling or simulation of the interaction between ETFs and HFT in times of financial 
stress and across multiple asset classes will allow for a better understanding of possible 
unintended consequences of the „fusion‟ of the two innovations (See Section 4.1).  
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